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Classification

14. The file of an inmate shall be carefully reviewed before any decision is made concerning the classification, reclassification or transfer of the inmate.
Judicial Consideration -
See also transfer cases annotated under s15 of the Penitentiary Act, supra.
Morin v The National SHU Review Committee et al - (1985) 20 CCC (3d) 123 (FCA)
	- This section clearly requires the personal consideration and decision by the institutional director or his lawful deputy before a transfer takes place. It applies to a decision to transfer a person to a Special Handling Unit. An instruction from persons in higher authority than institutional heads in the Correctional Service cannot substitute for such personal consideration and decision-making. While Commissioner's Directives are valid as internal directives binding penitentiary officials in relation to the internal discipline of the Correctional Service, they cannot confer any legal authority in relation to inmates where they conflict with the regulations made by the Governor-in-Council.
Mitchell v Cozier et al - (1986) 1 FTR 138 (FCTD)
	- The term "reclassification" must be taken to comprehend the complete process of emergency transfer, case documentation study, review by the regional transfer board, and the board's final decision whether to uphold the transfer and to reclassify or not.
Ericson v Deputy Director of Correctional Service of Canada (Pacific) and Director of Kent Institution - Unreported, November 14, 1991, No. CC911298, Vancouver Registry (BCSC) (Butterworths No. 36192)
	- The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to quash a decision transferring him from minimum security to maximum security. The applicant enjoyed various privileges at minimum security and lost those privileges and was subjected to a greater degree of security at the maximum-security institution.
	He was told that he had been named by several inmates at the minimum-security institution as the person responsible for the traffic of narcotics in that institution and that, therefore, he and others were being transferred. He denied the allegation without knowing the details, but his denial was rejected and the transfer confirmed. There was evidence of an increasing drug problem in the institution marked by incidents of overdose by two prisoners and the accidental death of a third. A number of inmates anonymously named the petitioner as the organizer of the trafficking in the institution and the authorities reacted to it as an emergency, transferring the petitioner out, pending further inquiry.
	Three further investigations took place by the authorities at the institution, by authorities from another institution and by the RCMP. At the conclusion of those investigations, the petitioner's transfer was confirmed. The petitioner had no idea of the identity of those who named him or the nature of their evidence against him. The authorities maintained that to provide him with further details of the allegations against him would reveal the sources of the confidential communications and expose other inmates to the risk of retaliation. The petitioner had no record of conviction in any drug-related matter, nor any prior disciplinary proceedings in the prison system for such matters.
	The court quashed the transfer decision and ordered the petitioner returned to the same or some other appropriate minimum-security institution. The court felt that the petitioner could have been given greater detail of the case against him so that he could have a fair opportunity to respond without jeopardizing the safety of the others in the prison. The court said:
		With all due deference to the respondents, I cannot think that the petitioner could not have been given greater detail here. If other inmates have informed against him, it is reasonable to suppose they did not implicate themselves in any wrongdoing. So, probably, their evidence was hearsay. If they informed about the petitioner's reputation within the institution they could have nothing to say that would identify them. If the reputation they spoke of identified the petitioner with any specific activity he should have been given that detail so that he would know from what it was he must defend himself. I think it unlikely that a drug trafficking operation within a prison is so devoid of system that specific allegations cannot be put to a suspect. I incline to the view expressed by Smith, J in Balian v Regional Transfer Board et al [1988] 62 CR (3d) 258 at 266, 'that experience has shown that a great deal can be disclosed while protecting the identity of fellow inmates who inform'. I am not convinced that in this case the convergence of evidence from eight inmates, otherwise said to be unrelated to each other, and the coinciding findings of the three separate investigations points so inexorably to the petitioner's guilt that he must have been guilty. All eight inmates may have listened to the same source. All three investigators may have interviewed the same informants. There is no way of telling. What is clear is that the petitioner was not permitted to playa reasonably informed part in the whole process. That was procedurally unfair to him.
Bruce, Rivett, Cooke and Leet v Correctional Service of Canada (AG Canada) - (1991) 7 CR (4th) 93 (NBQB)
	- A group of prisoners at Dorchester Medium Security Penitentiary were put in segregation. They were then each given a written notice that they had been recommended for involuntary transfer to maximum security. The notices said that "consistent, reliable" information indicated they had been involved in drug trafficking, smuggling cash and manipulation and intimidation. Progress Summaries were attached to the notices and these summaries purported to include the "gist" of the security information alleged to have been obtained from 11 "highly reliable" but anonymous informers. The report also included an allegation that a contract had been put on the life of another prisoner and that one of the prisoners was a prime suspect. There was no evidence of any improper behaviour on the part of any of the prisoners or their visitors and none of them had been convicted of any disciplinary offences. Following all internal procedures, the prisoners were transferred to the Atlantic Institution at Renous, a maximum-security institution. They sought habeas corpus to challenge the confinement at the Atlantic Institution on the grounds that the transfer was illegal.
	The court granted the application and ordered their return to Dorchester.
	The evidence supported that the transfer of the prisoners to maximum security from medium security reduced their day-to-day freedom and affected their hopes for parole and passes. Section 14 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations provided that a file of an inmate should be carefully reviewed before any decision was made concerning transfer. There was no evidence to support that this had been done by any of the decision makers here prior to the transfer. In fact, the decision appeared to have been based solely upon the report of hearsay allegations from anonymous informers. The Progress Summaries were prepared for purposes of recommending the transfer and not to review the file. Because s14 was not complied with, the transfers were illegal. In ordering the prisoners' return to Dorchester, the court further ordered that any future decisions concerning these individuals and any transfer should be made by persons who were not involved in the original decisions and further, that the prisoner should not be put in isolation unless a lawful order is made by an appropriate officer.
See also Mcllvride v AG Canada, AGBC and Director of Kent Institution -Unreported, November 4, 1987, No. CC871785, Vancouver (BCSC) annotated under Penitentiary Service Regulation 13 (supra) and s13 of the Penitentiary Act.
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