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INTERPRETATION


2. Definitions - In this Act,
  "Board" means the National Parole Board established by section 3;
  "day parole" means parole the terms and conditions of which require the inmate to whom it is granted to return to prison from time to time during the duration of the parole or to return to prison after a specified period;
  "inmate" means a person who is under a sentence of imprisonment imposed pursuant to an Act of Parliament or imposed for criminal contempt of court, but does not include
  "prison" means a place of confinement other than a penitentiary as defined in Part I of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act;
 
 (a)
a child within the meaning of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, chapter J-3 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately prior to April 2, 1984, who is under sentence of imprisonment for an offence known as a delinquency under that Act,
 
 (b)
a young person within the meaning of the Young Offenders Act who has been committed to custody under that Act, or
 
 (c)
a person in custody solely by reason of a sentence of imprisonment that has been ordered to be served intermittently pursuant to section 737 of the Criminal Code;
  "magistrate" repealed;
  "parole" means authority granted under this Act to an inmate to be at large during the inmate's term of imprisonment and includes day parole;
  "parole supervisor" means a person charged with the guidance and supervision of a paroled inmate or of an inmate who is subject to mandatory supervision;
  "paroled inmate" means a person to whom parole has been granted; "provincial parole board" means, in relation to any province, a parole board appointed pursuant to section 12 and includes
 
 (a)
the Board of Parole that Ontario may appoint pursuant to subsection 12(1) of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, if that board has been appointed to act as a parole board under this Act, and
 
 (b)
the Board of Parole that British Columbia may appoint pursuant to subsection 13(1) of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, if that board has been appointed to act as a parole board under this Act.
[RSC 1970 cP-2, 1976-77 c53 s17; 1980-81-82-83 c110 s77; RS 1985 c35 (2nd Supp) s1]

Judicial Consideration -
 
"inmates"
 
Ex parte Allard - (1970) 1 CCC (2d) 461 (BCSC)
  - A prisoner remains an "inmate" while on parole, on apprehension on suspension of parole and on being returned to custody after suspension of parole.
 
"day parole", "parole" & "parole inmate"
 
R v Hales - (1974) 18 CCC (2d) 240 (Man CA)
  - In construing the old definition of "parole" and whether or not it included day parole it was held it did unless the contrary appears either expressly or impliedly.
 
Ex parte Davidson - (1974) 22 CCC (2d) 122 (BCCA)
  - Followed Hales, supra, and held that the term "parole" includes day parole unless a contrary intention is expressed or to be implied. Also held that the term "paroled inmate", except where a contrary intention appears, include a person on day parole.
 
Ex parte Carlson - (1975) 26 CCC (2d) 65 (Ont CA)
  - Followed Hales, supra, and held that the term "parole" includes both general and day parole unless the contrary appears either expressly or impliedly.
 
Ex parte Kerswill - (1975) 28 CCC (2d) 362 (Ont HC)
  - An inmate granted a "temporary parole" by a parole certificate containing instructions and conditions for the purpose of completing a work project under supervision is, the term "temporary parole" not being defined, granted a parole or day parole by that certificate and not a temporary absence under s26 of the Penitentiary Act.
 
Re Grabina and The Queen - (1977) 34 CCC (2d) 52 (Ont HC)
  - The phrase "parole inmate" includes an inmate who has had his parole suspended and is in custody. (This is not specifically stated in the decision but is a necessary finding for the decision.)
 
Jackson v The Queen - Unreported, December 12, 1978 (SCC)
  - This case was decided after the amendments and reviewed both the Hales, supra, and Carlson, supra, decisions dealing with the old definition of "parole" and the question of whether or not "day parole" was included therein, and concluded that the new definition of "parole" can be taken as merely declaratory of existing jurisprudence.
 
Starr v National Parole Board - Unreported, December 2,1982, No. T-7785-82, Winnipeg (FCTD)
  - Applicant's mandatory supervision was set to begin on a Sunday, and, according to the practice of the Board, he was given an Unescorted Temporary Absence Permit for the preceding Friday and Saturday. On Saturday he committed further crimes, was arrested, and detained in custody. Applicant sought to quash decision of Board revoking his mandatory supervision. Held: Application allowed; revocation quashed. Board was without jurisdiction since applicant had not yet been released on mandatory supervision and therefore had not breached it. He was not a paroled inmate within s10(1)(e).
 
In Re Bishop - Unreported, January 13, 1984, Vancouver, No. CC832024 (SC)
  - When a parolee's parole is suspended and a warrant for his apprehension issued his authority to be at large is withdrawn as of that date and he is no longer on "parole" within the meaning of that word as defined in s2 of the Act. Consequently, time spent out of custody after suspension until revocation does not count as time on parole for purposes of recalculation of a sentence under s20 of the Act.
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