Upon receiving a sentence of imprisonment a persons fundamental freedoms are obviously somewhat reduced. The question always is - to what degree? The answer to this question will usually be found in the statute and regulations governing the imprisonment in question and the section or rule will then be measured against section 1 of the Charter. "Freedom of Association" is the most obvious example. It is clearly reduced by incarceration but is not completely extinguished. A certain residual freedom continues to exist. The Institutional Head or the Chairperson in disciplinary court has the power to reduce "association" further by placing a prisoner in administrative or punitive segregation. Indeed it used to be called "disassociation" and before that "solitary confinement". On the other hand, Parole Boards have the power to increase "association" once more. Matters involving "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and conscience" may be more difficult to limit whereas limits on "freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication" are usually imposed by rules and regulations. Interestingly, s73 of the CCRA expressly provides for reasonable opportunities to peacefully assemble and associate between inmates, subject to reasonable limits for the security of the prison and the safety of persons. Similarly s75 applies to reasonable opportunities to participate in ones religion and in s74 to an opportunity to contribute to certain types of decisions affecting them as a whole or as a specific group. In each case where it is clear that a fundamental freedom has been infringed or limited or even threatened, the question is whether the limit is a reasonable one, prescribed by law, that is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.

    To date, there have been a few prison law decisions dealing with the fundamental freedoms enumerated in s2 of the Charter. In Maltby (supra), it was held that limiting access to chaplains and religious ceremonies in provincial remand facilities did not violate the right to freedom of religion because, in the circumstances, the limitations were for reasons of security and the religious programs that did exist, though not perfect, were sufficient to allow for freedom of conscience and religion within such reasonable limits as were feasible in the circumstances. Similarly, the limits placed on the exercise of visiting privileges were held not to violate the rights to freedom of association and expression because the restrictions on those visiting privileges were incidental to legitimate government interests in security and were not unconstitutional restrictions.