BACK PREVIOUS SECTION NEXT SECTION


FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS


2. Fundamental freedoms - Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

 (a)

freedom of conscience and religion;

freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;

 (c)

freedom of peaceful assembly; and

 (d)

freedom of association.

 
Judicial Consideration -
 
s2(a)
 

Re Maltby et al. and A.G. Saskatchewan - (1983), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 153 (Sask. Q.B.)

 

- The limiting of access to chaplains and to religious ceremonies in a provincial remand detention facility did not violate the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by this section. In the circumstances the limitation in relation to chapel service was for reasons of security. The religious programs that did exist, while not perfect, were nevertheless sufficient to allow for freedom of conscience and religion within such reasonable limits as were feasible in the circumstances.

 

Milton v The Queen et al - Unreported, October 30,1986, No. T-1719-86 (FCTD)

 

- A prisoner was granted parole subject to a special condition that he "... not have contact with any members or associates of the following motorcycle clubs - Hells Angels, Sultans, Odin's Wrath, Bikers". He asked the Board to remove the condition and the Board refused. He then sought certiorari to quash the decision imposing the special condition and the subsequent decision refusing to remove it. He further claimed a breach of the rules of natural justice in that the Board refused to give him access to the information upon which it based its decision to impose or refuse to remove the condition. After hearing the certiorari application, the Board, on its own motion, removed the condition. Consequently, the court declined to grant the relief sought as the matter had become academic.

 
ss2(b) and (d)
 

Re Maltby et al and AG Saskatchewan et al - (1983),2 CCC (3d) 153 (Sask QB)

 

- The conditions for the exercise of visiting privileges in a provincial remand detention centre did not violate the rights to freedom of association and expression as set out in s2(b) and (d) of the Charter. While the privileges set out for remand prisoners were different to those for prisoners serving their sentences, the privileges or restrictions on those privileges were incidental to the legitimate government interests in security and were not unconstitutional restrictions.

 

Bruntwick v Canada (National Parole Board) - (1986) 55 CR (3d) 332, 32 CCC (3d) 321 (FCTD)

 

- While the imposition of a special condition by the National Parole Board on a full parolee which provided a "prohibition from any non-fortuitous meetings or communications with people having a criminal record or with whom you think might have a criminal record" undoubtedly curtailed the parolee's freedom of association, nevertheless, it was clearly established that the condition was patently reasonable and imposed no excessive restrictions and that the condition had a rational basis and stood within reasonable bounds acceptable and accepted in a democratic society and as such, met the tests of s1 of the Charter.

 

Olson v The Queen - Unreported, November 15, 1990, No. T-2603-89 (FCTD) (Butterworths No. 35008)

 

- The applicant challenged the institutional telephone policy which allowed inmates to make two "legal or business" calls per week, two resocialization calls per month and emergency calls. Calls could be made on a collect basis only. In addition, he challenged specific restrictions on himself which prohibited him from making "legal" phone calls for a month when he was found to have abused the privilege by pretending to call a lawyer when, in fact, he was not. The applicant had made extensive use of the telephone policy and was involved in 19 civil court actions. The court, following Re Latham and Solicitor General of Canada et al (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 393 (FCTD) (see annotation at p5135) held that s10(b) did not apply to the applicant's situation. The court further noted that the calls that the applicant wished to make did not relate to the situation such as internal disciplinary charges or possible further loss of residual liberty within the institution. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the court that the restrictions resulted in any prejudice to the applicant. There is no Charter right allowing penitentiary inmates to telephone their lawyers in an unrestricted fashion. The principles of fundamental justice in s7 of the Charter do not require unlimited access to the telephone by penitentiary inmates. While prisoners do not lose all of their civil rights upon incarceration, it is clear that many restrictions necessarily arise upon incarceration, including restrictions on a prisoner's freedom of expression, freedom of association and liberty.

TOP