99. (1) Definitions - In this Part,

"Board" means the National Parole Board continued by section 103 and includes a provincial parole board where it exercises jurisdiction in respect of parole as provided by section 112 or in respect of which any other provision of this Part is, by virtue of section 113, rendered applicable;

"Commissioner" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"community-based residential facility" has the same meaning as in subsection 66(3);

"day parole" means the authority granted to an offender by the Board or a provincial parole board to be at large during the offender's sentence in order to prepare the offender for full parole or statutory release, the conditions of which require the offender to return to a penitentiary, a community-based residential facility or a provincial correctional facility each night, unless otherwise authorized in writing;

"full parole" means the authority granted to an offender by the Board or a provincial parole board to be at large during the offender's sentence;

"institutional head" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"long-term supervision" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"Minister" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"offender" means

a person, other than a young person within the meaning of the Youth Criminal Justice Act , who is under a sentence imposed before or after the coming into force of this section

(i)  pursuant to an Act of Parliament or, to the extent that
     this Part applies, pursuant to a provincial Act, or

(ii) on conviction for criminal or civil contempt of court if the
     sentence does not include a requirement that the
     offender return to that court, or

a young person within the meaning of the Youth Criminal Justice Act with respect to whom an order, committal or direction under section 76, 89, 92 or 93 of that Act has been made,

but does not include a person whose only sentence is a sentence being served intermittently pursuant to section 732 of the Criminal Code;

"parole" means full parole or day parole;

"penitentiary" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"provincial parole board" means the Ontario Board of Parole, la Commission quebecoise des liberations conditionnelles, the Board of Parole for the Province of British Columbia or any other parole board established by the legislature or the lieutenant governor in council of a province;

"regulations" means regulations made by the Governor in Council pursuant to section 156;

"sentence" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"serious harm" means severe physical injury or severe psychological damage;

"Service" has the same meaning as in Part I;

"statutory release" means release from imprisonment subject to supervision before the expiration of an offender's sentence, to which an offender is entitled under section 127;

"statutory release date" means the date determined in accordance with section 127;

"unescorted temporary absence" means an unescorted temporary absence from penitentiary authorized under section 116;

"victim" has the same meaning as in Part I.

"working day" means a day on which offices in the federal public administration are generally open in the province in question.

    (2) References to expiration of sentence - For the purposes of this Part, a reference to the expiration according to law of the sentence of an offender shall be read as a reference to the day on which the sentence expires, without taking into account

any period during which the offender could be entitled to statutory release; or

any remission that stands to the credit of the offender on the coming into force of this section.

    (3) Exercise of powers, etc - Except as otherwise provided by this Part or by the regulations,

powers, duties and functions assigned to the Commissioner by or pursuant to this Part may only be exercised or performed by the Commissioner or, where the Commissioner is absent or incapacitated or where the office is vacant, by the person acting in the place of the Commissioner; and

powers, duties and functions assigned to the institutional head by or pursuant to this Part may only be exercised or performed by the institutional head or, where the institutional head is absent or incapacitated or where the office is vacant, by the person who, at the relevant time, is in charge of the penitentiary.

[1992, c. 20, s. 99; 1995, c. 22, s. 13, c. 42, ss. 26, 69(E), 70(E), 71(F); 1997, c. 17, s. 17; 2002, c. 1, s. 173; 2003, c. 22, s. 155.]

R. v C.A.M. - [1996] 1 SCR 500

- Parole eligibility is determined under the Criminal Code and under the Corrections Act. A person serving a numerical term of incarceration under the Code becomes eligible for full parole after serving one third of the sentence or seven years. The commencement coincides with the date the sentence is imposed. In contrast, a person serving life imprisonment, other than as a minimum sentence, becomes eligible after serving seven years, calculated to commence at the date of arrest. Therefore, the Corrections Act provides that, a person sentenced to life imprisonment would be eligible for full parole before a person sentenced to a numerical term beyond twenty years. The actual granting date of full parole is not the same as the eligibility date.

R. v Wood - (1999) , 139 CCC (3d) 468 (N.S.C.A.)

- The accused applied to be released pending an appeal from conviction, pursuant to s679 of the Criminal Code. The issue was jurisdiction; whether the accused was "in custody" for the purposes of s679 release. The accused was granted day parole conditional release by the NPB. The Crown argued that he was not "in custody" while on day parole and that the Court did not have jurisdiction to amend conditions of release. The Court held that jurisdiction to release from day parole pending an appeal does rest with the Court and that a parolee is deemed to be serving the sentence while on day parole, therefore he is "in custody" for the purposes of s679.

R. v McKenna - (1994), 151 N.B.R. (2d) 236, 387 A.P.R. 236 (N.B.C.A.)

- M. was convicted for contempt of Court when he refused to identify a person who sold explosives to him, at a trial for a different accused who was charged with possession of explosives with intent to endanger life. M. was sentenced to 18 months incarceration without eligibility for parole or time off for good behaviour. His appeal from conviction was dismissed but appeal from sentence was allowed and the conditions were deleted from the sentence, as they were unsanctioned, given that the parole board has exclusive jurisdiction to grant parole. The Court found that the definition of "offender" included anyone who has a sentence imposed for contempt of Court.

Smallwood v. Kent Institution - [1994] BCJ No. 1361 (B.C.S.C.)

- This was an application for habeas corpus due to amended legislation. The prisoner was serving a 22 year sentence, had been released on day parole, had his parole suspended and revoked and when his release date was recalculated was given no credit for remission earned prior to 1977. In consideration of the jurisprudence and the legislative framework of ss127 and 138 of the CCRA, Lysyk J. dismissed the application, finding no reason to depart from the Act. The applicant was an "offender" for the purposes of applying the Act, as "a person who is under a sentence imposed before or after the coming into force of this section (a) pursuant to an Act of Parliament..."

R. v Wood - Daoud v Canada (A.G.) (1997), 133 F.T.R. 266 (Fed. T.D.)

- This was an application for judicial review of an accelerated parole review. The applicant was a citizen of Lebanon, convicted of drug trafficking. He was diagnosed with a brain tumour, and applied for parole to effect deportation. The application was denied due to no progress being made in rehabilitation and continued denial of guilt. The applicant appealed to the appeal division, arguing that he did not receive timely disclosure and that the decision was punishment for his denial of guilt. The appeal division affirmed the decision of the review Board. The Federal Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board properly determined that the applicant remained an undue risk and was given due consideration for parole.

Driskell v Manitoba (A.G.) - [1999] 11 WWR 615, 67 CCR (2d) 147, 140 Man R. (2d) 49 (Man. QB)

- The reference to "serious harm" in paragraph 55 only cites the CCRA definition, namely "severe physical injury and severe psychological damage". This term is used to determine the sentences inmates are serving, demographics which are presented as evidence in this case. The comment here really adds nothing to an interpretation of "serious harm", other than the exact language of the CCRA.

Frankie v Canada (Commissioner of Corrections) - (1993) 61 F.T.R. 274

- A paroled inmate had been suspended prior to the CCRA, but revoked after the CCRA came into force. The issue was whether earned remission was calculated into the determination of the new statutory release date. The Court considered the legislative history dating to the Ticket of Leave Act of 1952, and interpreted the CCRA to determine that, when either parole or statutory release is canceled, the rest of the sentence will be served and a new statutory release date calculated, based on the date that the parole or statutory release was suspended. The new date would be after two thirds of the remaining sentence is served.

Ex parte Kerswill - (1975) 28 CCC (2d) 362 (Ont. H.C.J.)

- The Parole Act did not provide for temporary parole and the Penitentiary Act provided for "temporary absence" but not temporary parole. This was an application for habeas corpus with certioria in aid. Because the conditions were different from those posted in a bulletin, the accused walked away from a supervised 3 month work project. He then got charged with robbery, convicted, and sentenced to 2 years. The applicant argued that the effect of the sentence was that it ran concurrent to that being served while on "parole". The application was dismissed. Any parole was forfeited when he was convicted of an indictable offence, pursuant to s21(1) of the Parole Act.

99.1 Application to persons subject to long-term supervision order - A person who is required to be supervised by a long-term supervision order is deemed to be an offender for the purposes of this Part, and sections 100, 101, 109 to 111 and 140 to 145 apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to the person and to the long-term supervision of that person

[1997, c. 17, s. 18.]

99.2 Young persons - In this Part, a young person within the meaning of the Youth Criminal Justice Act with respect to whom a committal or direction under section 89, 92 or 93 of that Act has been made begins to serve his or her sentence on the day on which the sentence comes into force in accordance with subsection 42(12) of that Act.

[2002, c. 1, s. 174.]

R. v Payne - (2001) 41 C.R. (5th) 156 (Ont. S.C.J.)

- The accused was sentenced to 5 and 1/2 years imprisonment and a long-term supervision order of 10 years. A dangerous offender application was dismissed. The Court found that a long term supervision order was appropriate where the accused is one-step from being sentenced to an indeterminate sentence. A long term supervision order is not the same as conventional parole or probation. The jurisdiction to set conditions of long term supervision rests with the NPB at the time of release. The protection of society is the dominant consideration. The threshold is the current likelihood of causing future harm, beyond a reasonable doubt, with consideration of whether there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community and of the "treatability" of the accused. Pursuant to s743.6 of the Criminal Code, the parole eligibility is increased to one half of the sentence. There was medical evidence in this case that the accused would not be deterred or rehabilitated within the usual eligibility period. The Court can, and did, make recommendations to the NPB.

R. v Blair - (2002) 2002 BCCA 205 (B.C.C.A.)

- The accused was convicted of sexual assault, appealed the conviction, appeal dismissed. Dangerous offender application was dismissed. Appeal from sentence also dismissed. The sentence was 7 years imprisonment with a 10 year supervision order. The accused spent 2 years in custody prior to being sentenced, therefore the total sentence exceeded the maximum penalty for sexual assault, which is 10 years. Under s718.2(c) of the Criminal Code, combined sentences should not be unduly harsh. The Court found that, while a supervision order is not a consecutive sentence, those principles apply. The long term offender provisions require that the trial judge impose a supervision order where the Crown establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a substantial risk of reoffence. An assessment of the risk of reoffence is at the root of determining an appropriate period of supervision. Factors to consider include the circumstances of the offence. Also, the Supreme Court can reduce the period of supervision on application and the NPB can set conditions it deems appropriate. The Court did not interfere with the supervision order.

NOTE: dissent would have reduced supervision order to 5 years.