23. (1) Service to obtain certain information about offender - When a person is sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary, the Service shall take all reasonable steps to obtain, as soon as is practicable,

relevant information about the offence;

relevant information about the person's personal history, including the person's social, economic, criminal and young-offender history;

any reasons and recommendations relating to the sentencing or committal that are given or made by

the court that convicts, sentences or commits the person, and

any court that hears an appeal from the conviction, sentence or committal;

any reports relevant to the conviction, sentence or committal that are submitted to a court mentioned in subparagraph (c)(i) or (ii); and

any other information relevant to administering the sentence or committal, including existing information from the victim, the victim impact statement and the transcript of any comments made by the sentencing judge regarding parole eligibility.

      (2) Access by offender - Where access to the information obtained by the Service pursuant to subsection (1) is requested by the offender in writing, the offender shall be provided with access in the prescribed manner to such information as would be disclosed under the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act.

      (3) Disclosure to Service - No provision in the Privacy Act or the Access to Information Act shall operate so as to limit or prevent the Service from obtaining any information referred to in paragraphs (1)(a) to (e).

24. (1) Accuracy, etc, of information - The Service shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up-to-date and complete as possible.

      (2) Correction of information - Where an offender who has been given access to information by the Service pursuant to subsection 23(2) believes that there is an error or omission therein,

the offender may request the Service to correct that information; and

where the request is refused, the Service shall attach to the information a notation indicating that the offender has requested a correction and setting out the correction requested.

[1992, c. 20, s. 24; 1995, c. 42, s. 9(F).]

Tehrankari v. Canada (Correctional Service) - (2000), 188 F.T.R. 206, 38 C.R. (5th) 43, [2000] F.C.J. No.495 (F.C.T.D.)

- Where an inmate requested of the CSC that statements falsely alleging an assault against another inmate be stricken from his record, the CSC responded by simply noting the request for a correction in his file. The inmate applied for judicial review, concerned that the erroneous information may be used in a manner prejudicial to him. The court allowed the application and ordered the CSC decision set aside, remitting the matter for reconsideration. The signal given by Parliament in section 24, in the form of a statutory duty imposed on the CSC, is that the "information banks" reflected in various reports maintained about offenders should contain the best information possible: exact, correct information without relevant omissions and data not burdened by past stereotyping or archaisms related to the offender. In Parliament's view, the quality of the information prescribed by section 24 leads to better decisions about an offender's incarceration and, in this manner, leads to the achievement of the purposes of the Act. Section 24 gives rise to the decision by the Service whether or not to rectify the record of an offender who believes the information about him/her is inaccurate. Such a decision, limited to primary facts, does not involve considerable choices by the CSC and turns on the application of proper legal principles and involves the rights and interests of an offender. Paragraph 24(2)(b) provides "where the request is refused, the Service shall attach to the information a notation...". Properly construed, these words enable the CSC to correct or refuse to correct the information - because there is this choice, the CSC exercises a discretion when making the decision to correct or not. If so, such discretion is reviewable on proper principles governing the review of discretionary decisions such as bad faith, improper purpose, irrelevant consideration and error of law. The court held that in this case the Commissioner, in exercising his discretion to refuse to correct the information requested, committed a number of reviewable errors. First, he did not properly interpret the scope of the CSC's obligations in terms of the accuracy, completeness and up-to-date nature of the information. This misinterpretation led him to conclude some of the information on file was valid or justified. Second, he failed to appreciate the nature and limits of the discretion inherent in a decision to refuse to correct information. Parliament simply did not intend inaccurate information to remain on file counterbalanced only by an offender's correction request noted on file. The CSC, in the circumstances, was obligated to consider why a correction was not appropriate. Third, whatever appreciation the Commissioner had on the scope of the discretion to refuse a correction, such refusal had to be based on proper considerations - these were lacking in this case. To refuse to correct misinformation on the grounds the Service exercised its option to increase the inmate's security level or to justify inaction to correct on the basis the information was still relevant for administrative purposes amounts to improper considerations.

25. (1) Service to give information to parole boards, etc - The Service shall give, at the appropriate times, to the National Parole Board, provincial governments, provincial parole boards, police, and any body authorized by the Service to supervise offenders, all information under its control that is relevant to release decision-making or to the supervision or surveillance of offenders.

      (2) Police to be notified of releases - Before the release of an inmate on an unescorted temporary absence, parole or statutory release, the Service shall notify all police forces that have jurisdiction at the destination of the inmate if that destination is known.

      (3) Service to give information to police in some cases - Where the Service has reasonable grounds to believe that an inmate who is about to be released by reason of the expiration of the sentence will, on release, pose a threat to any person, the Service shall, prior to the release and on a timely basis, take all reasonable steps to give the police all information under its control that is relevant to that perceived threat.

[1992, c. 20, s. 25; 1995, c. 42, s. 71(F).]

R v. Dupont - (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 77, 20 C.R. (5th) 392, 165 D.L.R. (4th) 512, [1998] A.Q. No.2270 (Que.C.A.)

- Although a CSC psychologist's mandate fell within the missions of the Correctional Services and the National Parole Board in relation to inmates, the accused inmate’s communications with the psychologist did take place in the more general context of a psychologist-patient relationship. However, although the accused inmate disclosed information to the psychologist in confidence that it would not be disclosed, the communications did not meet the criteria set out to confer on the communication a privilege. The psychologist was working for the Correctional Service in the context of a treatment offered to the accused inmate with a view to his release. Correctional Services is required to give to the National Parole Board the relevant information that it has. The psychologist could not therefore promise to keep confidential the information that the appellant would communicate to her, and which was relevant to the decision on his release. From this perspective, it is not possible to find that the confidential nature of the communication was essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. In fact, confidentiality is foreign to the relation that an inmate has with Correctional Services (and its agents) in the context of sections 5 and 25 of the relevant statute. The inmate’s communication with the CSC psychologist in this context was properly admitted at his trial.

Muhonen v. Davies - [2000] O.J. No.3418 (Ont.S.C.J.)

- The defendants motioned for security for costs partly on the ground that there was good reason to believe that the action was frivolous or vexatious. The inmate plaintiff sued N and the Attorney General of Canada for defamation. N was an employee of the CSC. Pursuant to section 25(3) of the CCRA, the CSC is obliged to communicate information to police regarding inmates about to be released where there were reasonable grounds to believe that the inmate was a threat to any person. A package of information provided to N, along with the instructions to deliver that documentation to Sault Ste. Marie Police included several relevant items from the plaintiff’s correctional file. On the basis of that documentation, N also submitted a report to the police that focused on a number of high risk factors intimating that the plaintiff was likely to re-offend sexually. The court held that there was no basis to suggest that the information provided to N did not relate to the plaintiff, or that the information was fundamentally or obviously flawed in any way. There was ample basis in the information provided to N for the statements attributed to her, and no reason to doubt the accuracy of those statements. There was no inaccuracy or excess from which negligence, recklessness or malice might be inferred. There was no basis for the allegation that N was reckless, or malicious, even giving the very broadest possible meaning to "malice". Comparing the content of the information provided to N by CSC, and the statements attributed to her and given that the allegation of malice relates only to inaccuracy and excess in describing that information, the court found that there was no basis for the allegation of malice and that the plaintiff's action against N and the CSC was frivolous. The motion for security for costs was granted.

26. (1) Disclosure of information to victims - At the request of a victim of an offence committed by an offender, the Commissioner

shall disclose to the victim the following information about the offender:

the offender's name,

the offence of which the offender was convicted and the court that convicted the offender,

the date of commencement and length of the sentence that the offender is serving, and

eligibility dates and review dates applicable to the offender under this Act in respect of temporary absences or parole; and

may disclose to the victim any of the following information about the offender, where in the Commissioner's opinion the interest of the victim in such disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of the offender's privacy that could result from the disclosure:

the offender's age,

the location of the penitentiary in which the sentence is being served,

the date, if any, on which the offender is to be released on temporary absence, work release, parole or statutory release,

the date of any hearing for the purposes of a review under section 130,

any of the conditions attached to the offender's temporary absence, work release, parole or statutory release,

the destination of the offender on any temporary absence, work release, parole or statutory release, and whether the offender will be in the vicinity of the victim while travelling to that destination, and

whether the offender is in custody and, if not, the reason why the offender is not in custody.

      (2) Idem - Where a person has been transferred from a penitentiary to a provincial correctional facility, the Commissioner may, at the request of a victim of an offence committed by that person, disclose to the victim the name of the province in which the provincial correctional facility is located, if in the Commissioner's opinion the interest of the victim in such disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of the person's privacy that could result from the disclosure.

      (3) Disclosure of information to other persons - Subsection (1) also applies, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to a person who satisfies the Commissioner

that harm was done to the person, or the person suffered physical or emotional damage, as a result of an act of an offender, whether or not the offender was prosecuted or convicted for that act; and

that a complaint was made to the police or the Crown attorney, or an information was laid under the Criminal Code, in respect of that act.

      (4) Idem - Subsection (2) also applies, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to a person who satisfies the Commissioner.

that harm was done to that person, or the person suffered physical or emotional damage, as a result of an act of a person referred to in subsection (2), whether or not the person referred to in subsection (2) was prosecuted or convicted for that act; and

that a complaint was made to the police or the Crown attorney, or an information was laid under the Criminal Code, in respect of that act.

Wright v. Canada (Attorney General) - [1999] F.C.J. No.1304 (F.C.T.D.)

- Correctional officers prepared a report that referred to W's ex-fiancée as his victim. W contested the validity of that statement. While imprisoned, a marriage was planned and then cancelled as a result of his initiative. The ex-fiancée subsequently complained to the RCMP that the applicant had threatened her and that she feared for her safety. W alleges that these complaints were vindictive and were an attempt to make life difficult for him after he broke off their relationship. The ex-fiancée never filed a written complaint with the police, and subsequently refused to co-operate with the police on any investigation of her oral complaint against W. W's position was that his ex-fiancée was not a victim because he had not been convicted of any offence regarding her, and there should not be disclosure to her pursuant to section 26 unless he is given an opportunity to contest the assertion that she was harmed as a result of an act of his, which act became the subject of a complaint to the police. The court stated that the term "victim" is defined in section 2 of the CCRA as a person who has suffered harm as a result of the commission of an offence, and intimated that the ex-fiancée was most likely not a victim as defined in the Act. Moreover, the court could not conclude that the Commissioner (or his delegate) had determined that the conditions set out in subsection 26(3) of the CCRA had been satisfied to entitle the ex-fiancée to information about the offender. Indeed, there was no indication that the ex-fiancée had ever asked to be notified of W's whereabouts and release date pursuant to section 26 of the Act. If and when she does make such a request, a determination will be made as to whether she falls within the terms of the section.

Zarzour v. Canada - (2000), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 284, 196 F.T.R. 320, 268 N.R. 235, [2000] F.C.J. No.2070 (F.C.A.)

- An inmate was awarded damages by the Trial Division where the CSC and the National Parole Board unlawfully provided information about his file to his ex-wife. The Trial Division held that she was improperly classified as a “victim” vis-à-vis the CCRA, namely “a person to whom harm was done or who suffered physical or emotional damage as a result of the commission of an offence.” She was thus not entitled under sections 26 and 142 of the CCRA to the information in question. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision on the grounds that the ex-wife was entitled to the information she received pursuant to section 144. The Court of Appeal, however, did not directly contradict the Trial Division finding that the ex-wife was not a “victim” as defined by the CCRA.

27. (1) Information to be given to offenders - Where an offender is entitled by this Part or the regulations to make representations in relation to a decision to be taken by the Service about the offender, the person or body that is to take the decision shall, subject to subsection (3), give the offender, a reasonable period before the decision is to be taken, all the information to be considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that information.

      (2) Idem - Where an offender is entitled by this Part or the regulations to be given reasons for a decision taken by the Service about the offender, the person or body that takes the decision shall, subject to subsection (3), give the offender, forthwith after the decision is taken, all the information that was considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that information.

      (3) Exceptions - Except in relation to decisions on disciplinary offences, where the Commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of information under subsection (1) or (2) would jeopardize

the safety of any person,

the security of a penitentiary, or

the conduct of any lawful investigation,

the Commissioner may authorize the withholding from the offender of as much information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest identified in paragraph (a), (b), or (c).

      (4) Right to interpreter - An offender who does not have an adequate understanding of at least one of Canada's official languages is entitled to the assistance of an interpreter

at any hearing provided for by this Part of the regulations; and

for the purposes of understanding materials provided to the offender pursuant to this section.

[1992, c. 20, s. 27; 1995, c. 42, s. 10(F).]

[ CROSS REFERENCE - “DISCLOSURE” IN PLACEMENT AND TRANSFER OF INMATES SECTION ]

[ CROSS REFERENCE - “DISCLOSURE” IN ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION SECTION ]