5. Correctional Service of Canada - There shall continue to be a correctional service in and for Canada, to be known as the Correctional Service of Canada, which shall be responsible for

the care and custody of inmates;

the provision of programs that contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders and to their successful reintegration into the community;

the preparation of inmates for release;

parole and statutory release supervision and long-term supervision of offenders; and

maintaining a program of public education about the operations of the Service.

[1992, c. 20, s. 5; 1997, c. 17, s. 13.]

Fieldhouse v. Canada - (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 33 C.R. (4th) 346, [1994] B.C.J. No.1807 (B.C.S.C.)

- It must also be emphasized that, pursuant to s5(a) of the Act, the Correctional Service of Canada ''shall'' be responsible for ''the care and custody of inmates''. That provision not only imposes a duty on prison administrators to both know their inmates and to maintain a milieu in which those inmates can safely serve their sentences but also, in the court’s view, justifies the ''zero tolerance'' approach to drug use by inmates adopted by the warden, including the implementation of a random urinalysis program.

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) - (1995), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 136, 106 F.T.R. 241, [1996] 1 F.C. 857, [1995] F.C.J. No.1735 (F.C.T.D.)

- These were actions brought by inmates or former inmates of correctional institutions, challenging the constitutionality of paragraph 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act. In May 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the previous version of that provision. The new provision prohibited all prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more in a correctional institution from voting at a federal election. The court held that paragraph 51(e) infringed section 3 of the Charter and was not justified under section 1. Referring to section s5(b) of the CCRA, the court was of the opinion that clearly, corrections policy emphasizes the rehabilitation of the offender, and his reintegration into the community. While the defendants argued that disenfranchisement can contribute to rehabilitation, the court preferred the plaintiffs' evidence that suggested that paragraph 51(e) of the CEA hindered the rehabilitation of offenders and their successful reintegration into the community. The provision only served to further alienate prisoners from the community to which they must return, and in which their families live. Accordingly, the retributive effects of paragraph 51(e) are deleterious in that they are contrary to the purpose and principles contained in the CCRA.

Doran v. Canada (Correctional Services) - (1996), 108 F.T.R. 93, [1996] F.C.J. No.304 (F.C.T.D.)

- The CSC made a decision to deduct amounts for room and board from income paid to the applicant inmates from non-Treasury Board sources. The two inmates were each employed by an outside employer on a work release arrangement. The CSC urged that the Commissioner was authorized to make room and board deductions pursuant to sections 3, 4 and 5 and subsection 18(3) of the Act. In the court’s view, these provisions did not provide that authority. At the time of the hearing of this case, the express provisions of s78 and paragraph 96(z.2), in the court’s opinion, clearly indicated that Parliament intended to grant the Commissioner the authority to make deductions for room and board only where an inmate receives his or her pay as authorized by the Commissioner at rates approved by the Treasury Board. The Commissioner was not expressly authorized to make deductions where inmates received payments from sources other than those described in subsection 78(1). Here, the Act expressly permitted deductions from certain types of payments (i.e., those covered by subsection 78(1)). By implication, deductions from payments not covered by subsection 78(1) were not permitted.

R v. Dupont - (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 77, 20 C.R. (5th) 392, 165 D.L.R. (4th) 512, [1998] A.Q. No.2270 (Que.C.A.)

- Although a CSC psychologist's mandate fell within the missions of the Correctional Services and the National Parole Board in relation to inmates, the accused inmate’s communications with the psychologist did take place in the more general context of a psychologist-patient relationship. However, although the accused inmate disclosed information to the psychologist in confidence that it would not be disclosed, the communications did not meet the criteria set out to confer on the communication a privilege. The psychologist was working for the Correctional Service in the context of a treatment offered to the accused inmate with a view to his release. Correctional Services is required to give to the National Parole Board the relevant information that it has. The psychologist could not therefore promise to keep confidential the information that the appellant would communicate to her, and which was relevant to the decision on his release. From this perspective, it is not possible to find that the confidential nature of the communication was essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. In fact, confidentiality is foreign to the relation that an inmate has with Correctional Services (and its agents) in the context of sections 5 and 25 of the relevant statute.

6. (1) Commissioner - The Governor in Council may appoint a person to be known as the Commissioner of Corrections who, under the direction of the Minister, has the control and management of the Service and all matters connected with the Service.

    (2) National headquarters - The national headquarters of the Service and the offices of the Commissioner shall be in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National Capital Act.

    (3) Regional headquarters - The Commissioner may establish regional headquarters of the Service.

7. (1) Penitentiaries - Subject to subsection (3), the Commissioner may, by order, declare any prison as defined in the Prisons and Reformatories Act, or any hospital, to be a penitentiary in respect of any person or class of persons.

    (2) Idem - Subject to subsection (3), the Governor in Council may, by order, declare any place to be a penitentiary.

    (3) Provincial approval - No prison, hospital or place administered or supervised under the authority of an Act of the legislature of a province may be declared a penitentiary under subsection (1) or (2) without the approval of an officer designated by the lieutenant governor of that province.

Judicial Consideration -

Murray v. Canada (Correctional Service) - (1995), 101 F.T.R. 84, [1995] F.C.J. No.1225 (F.C.T.D.)

- Where an inmate submitted that neither the Act nor the Regulations give authority for the construction and habitation of institutions operating at a higher security level than maximum-security institutions, the court asserted that the new legislation did not allow him to question the legality of the existence of special handling units. Section 18 of the Regulations and section 30 of the Act provide a scale of levels of security by which an inmate should be classified. This security classification pertains to the individual inmate and does not claim to describe the levels of security attributed to a particular penitentiary nor does it provide any authority for the construction of any institution, be it maximum, medium or minimum. In the final analysis, nothing in the legislation precluded the existence or operation of a SHU.

8. Lands constituting penitentiary - In any proceedings before a court in Canada in which a question arises concerning the location or description of lands alleged to constitute a penitentiary, a certificate purporting to be signed by the Commissioner, setting out the location or description of those lands as constituting a penitentiary, is admissible in evidence and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, is proof that the lands as located or described in the certificate constitute a penitentiary.

9. Lawful custody - For greater certainty, a person who is an inmate by virtue of subparagraph (b)(ii) of the definition "inmate" in section 2 shall be deemed to be in the lawful custody of the Service.

10. Peace officer status - The Commissioner may in writing designate any staff member, either by name or by class, to be a peace officer, and a staff member so designated has all the powers, authority, protection and privileges that a peace officer has by law in respect of

 (a)

any person, while the person is in a penitentiary.

[1992, c. 20, s. 10; 1995, c. 42, s. 3; 1997, c. 17, s. 14. ]

Carlson v. Canada - [1998] F.C.J. No.733 (F.C.T.D.), 1998 CanLII 8109 (F.C.)

- In this action, the plaintiff inmate argued that he suffered injury during a forced extraction from his cell. Referring to s10 of the CCRA, the court asserted that Commissioner's Directive 003 defines as peace officers "Members employed in an penitentiary other than a Community Correctional Centre," and on that basis, concluded that the officers involved in the cell extraction were peace officers within the meaning of s25 of the Criminal Code.