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The applicant F sought an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the CSC’s decision to involuntarily transfer him from Matsqui Institution (medium security) to Kent Institution (maximum security), and an order of mandamus directing the CSC to transfer him back to Matsqui. While on day parole from Matsqui, F was arrested and charged with several offenses arising from six armed bank robberies. Following his arrest, F was placed in a provincial remand facility where he was expected to remain until the disposition of his charges. F’s day parole was revoked and he was involuntarily transferred on paper from Matsqui to Kent. F filed a notice of motion seeking judicial review of the decision to transfer him. After reviewing the notice of motion, and upon review of F’s file, the CSC acknowledged that the transfer had not been properly carried out. Accordingly, the CSC set aside the transfer and returned F by way of internal documentation to Matsqui. Subsequently, the CSC took a second look at F’s file and determined that he should be reclassified to maximum security. While still at the provincial remand center, F was served with a Notification of Recommendation for Involuntary Transfer. Later, a judge amended the remand warrant removing the directive to hold F in the provincial facility and he was accordingly brought to Kent Institution on an emergency basis. F had indicated at the time he had received the notice of transfer that he would be making written representations within forty-eight hours but did not do so. The warden did acknowledge the receipt of a letter from F, but it was received weeks after the notice of transfer was given to F and several days after the final decision to transfer was made. In relation to the initial transfer, F’s position was that the CSC did not in fact set aside that transfer and administratively return him to Matsqui. This argument was based on the fact that his personal effects were sent to Kent but were never returned to Matsqui after the date on which the initial transfer was set aside. In regards to the second transfer, F argued that the CSC never considered the submissions he made in response to the notice of transfer thereby amounting to a breach of their duty to act fairly.
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In response to F’s first argument, Jerome A.C.J. contended that there was no dispute that the initial transfer was conducted in an improper manner. However, the officials acted correctly and within their authority when, upon becoming apprised of their error with respect to the transfer procedure followed, they set aside the decision and corrected the defect. The CSC has the power to rescind their own administrative decisions once it is established that those decisions were improperly made. Provided that power is exercised in accordance with the obligation to act fairly towards inmates, no grounds will exist which would warrant judicial intervention. In light of the fact that F was being held at a provincial facility, Jerome A.C.J. placed no significance on the fact that his personal effects were not transferred back to Matsqui after the initial transfer was set aside. In regards to the second transfer that was ultimately carried out, Jerome A.C.J. asserted that the decision to transfer an inmate from one institution to another is essentially an administrative matter. As such, the courts will only interfere on the rare occasion when it is manifestly clear the inmate has not been dealt with fairly, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the transfer. In F’s case, Jerome A.C.J. found that the CSC did not breach their duty to act fairly. There existed reasonable concerns that prison officials had with respect to the appropriateness of F remaining at medium security. Moreover, F was properly served with the Notice of Recommendation for Involuntary Transfer and afforded an opportunity to respond. He indicated he would respond within forty-eight hours but did not do so until six days after the final decision to transfer him had been made. Thereafter, the warden explained to F that the proper recourse was for F to submit a grievance in accordance with the Commissioner’s Directives. The application was dismissed.
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