Dion v. Canada


(1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 108, [1986] R.J.Q. 2196 (Que.S.C.)

    D challenged certain amendments made to the Penitentiary Service Regulations by the government on May 2, 1985. Section 39(i.1) of the Regulations provided that an inmate committed a disciplinary offence if he uses an intoxicant, that is, alcohol, a drug, a narcotic or any other substance that causes a hallucination but does not include any authorized medication. Section 41.1 provided that a penitentiary employee may require an inmate to provide a urine sample where the employee considers it necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate. The issue before the Court was whether or not these amendments could survive Charter scrutiny?
    Galipeau J. declared that sections 39(i.1) and 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations did not satisfy the requirements of fundamental justice referred to in section 7 of the Charter and were thus of no force and effect. According to the Galipeau J., section 41.1 gave an officer or penitentiary employee the absolute power to require a urine sample, even if the inmate did not present any danger of committing discipline breaches or acts linked to the absorption of intoxicants. This section did not contain the essential elements of fundamental justice because it did not ensure an inmate of protection against abuse by one of the members of the penitentiary service. There was no requirement under the section that the employee act only upon reasonable and probable grounds, making it arbitrary by nature. Arbitrariness has always been, and will always be, contrary to fundamental justice. The same went for section 39(i.1) because it did not qualify, in any fashion, the prohibition that it imposes upon all prisoners, whoever they are, in what circumstances they find themselves, and regardless of the nature of the intoxicant that they consume or may consume, except where it is authorized medication that is used in the directed manner. It is impossible for an inmate to know the limits within which he may exercise his right to liberty and to security of his person in that it does not establish perimeters which allow him to foresee at what moment he runs a risk proportional to his fault. A total prohibition of intoxicants, without specifying the reason, becomes arbitrary. Thus, section 39(i.1) exhibited the same arbitrary characteristic that is reproached in section 41.1.
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