Collin v. Lussier

(1983), 6 C.R.R. 89, [1983] 1 F.C. 218 (F.C.T.D.)

    C sought judicial review of a decision by the CSC to involuntarily transfer him from a medium security penitentiary to a maximum-security penitentiary. C was employed as an inmate legal affairs clerk where he was active in preparing files that concerned the administration and the staff of the institution. C was never convicted of any disciplinary offenses. In a response to C's request for the written reasons for his transfer, a prison official wrote that the basis of the transfer was C's attitude and behaviour, which were considered unacceptable. C requested a review of his case arguing that his incarceration at maximum caused him extremely serious injury, essentially endangering his life in that he had no immediate access to the medical care which he required - he suffered from a heart condition - and that the stress level to which he was subjected to could be lethal. This request was unsuccessful in its result. The issues before the Court: Was the CSC decision ultra vires or outside of its jurisdiction? Did the decision to transfer contravene s7 of the Charter? In the circumstances, what remedy was the Federal Court authorized to grant pursuant to s24(1) of the Charter?
    In allowing the application Decary J. found that the grounds for C's transfer were stated in vague and imprecise terms. In considering the evidence as a whole it was evident that the transfer of C was the result of his activity as a legal affairs clerk, an activity that became a nuisance for prison officials. As such, the transfer constituted a disguised punishment. The transfer decision contravened ss13 and 14 of the Regulations. A transfer cannot be simply justified upon arrogance or lack of politeness. It could not be said that C posed an increased security risk. Moreover, the failure to show C his "Progress Summary" violated s14 of the Regulations. The right of access to medical care is part of the right to security of the person inherent in s7 of the Charter. The evidence indicated that the emergency procedure for medical care at night, at the maximum-security institution, was inadequate. The courts have recognized that a person who has suffered a coronary attack, such as C, is subject to special anxiety. It follows from the record as a whole that C's detention at the maximum-security penitentiary constituted an impairment of the security of his person under s7 of the Charter. This Court has jurisdiction to grant relief in the form of damages under subsection 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. C was an inmate in a federal penitentiary and the respondent was a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" as defined in section 2 of the Federal Court Act. Furthermore, sections 17 and 18 of that Act give the Trial Division jurisdiction to hear any claim for relief in the form of damages and to issue certiorari or mandamus. C was awarded damages of $18,136 for pecuniary loss, psychological damage, deprivation of medical care and denial of the security of his person (reduction of life expectancy and exemplary damages). [Note: the award of damages was overturned on appeal]
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