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Addy J. dismissed the application. It was asserted that a hearing conducted by a penitentiary disciplinary board for an alleged infraction of the Penitentiary Service Regulations is an administrative proceeding and is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in character. Addy J. held that except to the extent that there are statutory provisions or regulations having the force of law to the contrary, there is no requirement to conform to any particular procedure or to abide by the rules of evidence generally applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or adversary proceedings. There is, however, an overall duty to act fairly in administrative matters and, when applied to an administrative hearing or enquiry, the duty to act fairly translates into one of ensuring that the enquiry is carried out in a fair manner and with due regard to natural justice. Although the hearing is not to be conducted as an adversary proceeding but as an inquisitorial one, there is no duty on the person responsible for conducting the hearing to explore every conceivable defence or to suggest possible defences to the prisoner, although there is a duty to conduct a full and fair enquiry which, of course, might lead to the obligation of asking questions of the prisoner or of any witness, the answers to which might prove exculpatory in so far as the prisoner is concerned. He must, in other words, examine both sides of the question. Addy J. also wrote that there is no right to counsel; whether counsel representing the prisoner is to be allowed to be present is a matter for the discretion of the chairperson conducting the inquiry. Occasions might possibly arise where matters are so complicated from a legal standpoint that the duty to act fairly might require the presence of counsel. In this case, the Chairperson considered the request for representation by counsel and exercised his discretion to refuse counsel in light of the most recent jurisprudence on that subject. Unless the exercise of such discretion is patently unfair, Addy J. was of the view that the Federal Court should not interfere. In this case, there was no patent disregard of the evidence that would indicate bad faith on the part of the Chairperson or a breach of his general duty to act fairly.
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