Beaudoin v.
William Head Institution

(1997), 139 F.T.R. 133, [1997] F.C.J. No.1663 (F.C.T.D.)

    This was an application for judicial review of a decision by an independent chairperson to convict four inmates of the disciplinary offence of failing or refusing to provide a urine sample when demanded pursuant to section 54(a) of the CCRA. The charges arose when a correctional officer smelled what he believed to be an odour of hashish in the living quarters of a unit occupied by six inmates. Without further investigation, the officer then demanded a urine sample from each of the six residents. All four applicants refused to provide a urine sample. One of the applicants insisted on being examined by a nurse who expressed the opinion that the applicant did not look like he had ingested an intoxicant. Two of the applicants requested the opportunity to make representations to the warden in accordance with section 57(1) of the Act. The warden met with these two and offered the opinion that neither of them showed signs of having ingested an intoxicant. During the proceedings before the independent chairperson, the officer who had demanded the urine samples acknowledged that none of the four showed signs of having ingested an intoxicant. Further, he acknowledged that he did not have "reasonable grounds" to believe that any one of the applicants had ingested an intoxicant. The issue before the Federal Court: Did the Independent Chairperson commit a reviewable error in convicting B in that the Chairperson had no evidence before him on which to conclude that the correctional officer who demanded that B submit to urinalysis had reasonable grounds, as required by section 54(a) of the CCRA, to believe that he had ingested an intoxicant?
    Gibson J. allowed the application and set aside the disciplinary conviction. Gibson J. expressed the view that on the facts of this matter, at least in respect of the applicant B, there was simply no evidence before the chairperson on which to conclude that the officer who demanded the a urine sample from B had "reasonable grounds" to believe, as required by section 54(a), that B had ingested an intoxicant. The only evidence before the Chairperson, that being of a strong odour of hashish in the living unit in question, was that someone had ingested an intoxicant. Six inmates lived in the unit of which B was one. There was no evidence to indicate that other inmates in the institution had not been or could not have been present in the living unit in the minutes immediately preceding the time when the officer detected the odour of hashish. Several persons may have been responsible. Further, one of the applicants suggested to the officer that the odour in question was not, in fact, hashish but a cooking odour resulting from the meal that the residents had cooked themselves earlier in the evening. In the end, Gibson J. concluded that the Chairperson committed a reviewable error in convicting B in that he had no evidence before him on which to conclude that the officer who demanded that B submit to urinalysis had reasonable grounds to believe that he had ingested an intoxicant. In obiter, Gibson J. stated that it remains open as to whether the reduced expectation of privacy of an inmate of a federal correction institution is so low as to permit, without contravention of the Charter, a demand for a urine sample where the individual demanding the sample does not have reasonable grounds to believe that the inmate of who, the sample is demanded had ingested an intoxicant, or in other circumstances where it cannot be demonstrated that the public interest in safety and security in the correctional institutions is a predominant interest. The procedures of the CSC consequent on such a demand are clearly intrusive into generally applicable privacy expectations.
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